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Abstract
An autonomic detection coordinator is developed in this
paper, which constructs a multi-layered boundary to defend
against host-based intrusive anomalies by correlating sev-
eral observation-speciﬁc anomaly detectors. Two key ob-
servations facilitate the model formulation: First, different
anomaly detectors have different detection coverage and
blind spots; Second, diverse operating environments pro-
vide different kinds of information to reveal anomalies. Af-
ter formulating the cooperation between basic detectors as
a partially observable Markov decision process, a policy-
gradient reinforcement learning algorithm is applied to
search in an optimal cooperation manner, with the objec-
tive to achieve broader detection coverage and fewer false
alerts. Furthermore, the coordinator’s behavior can be ad-
justed easily by setting a reward signal to meet the diverse
demands of changing system situations. A preliminary ex-
periment is implemented, together with some comparative
studies, to demonstrate the coordinator’s performance in
terms of admitted criteria.
1 Introduction
Most existing anomaly detectors (AD) intend to char-
acterize a speciﬁc operating environment sufﬁciently well,
with an expected false alert rate to be determined a pri-
ori, and most of them attempt to detect individual instan-
tiations rather than classes of attacks, which limits their
broader application. Usually, the ﬁrst stage in establish-
ing an anomaly detection model is to select the observ-
able subjects (e.g., system call traces, network packet logs,
command line strings), and construct the operating envi-
ronments to characterize system normality. Due to their
speciﬁc characteristics, different observations have differ-
ent capabilities for characterizing system normality, and
thus the constructed operating environment might limit their
ability to discover some hidden intrusive attempts. For ex-
ample, some attacks might be detected in system call stacks,
whilst escaping from system call traces, and these phenom-
ena also exist even for the same anomaly detection model.
In this paper, we pay more attention to the effects of ob-
servations than to the speciﬁc detection techniques them-
selves. To achieve better performance in terms of broader
detection coverage, higher detection accuracy, and fewer
false alerts, we intend to develop a model to combine sev-
eral observation-speciﬁc ADs with different properties. The
basic assumption to support our work is that various oper-
ating environment could provide different kinds of normal
and anomalous information for system characterization, and
thus different ADs could create a consensus on the identiﬁ-
cation of anomalies, while intersecting their judgement on
false alerts.
Another motivation for combining different ADs is to an-
alyze and capture the “root-cause” of attack variants. It is
well known that an attack might have different behaviors,
and leave traces in various manners for the same system
vulnerability. The combination of different ADs is expected
to abstract speciﬁc or concrete behaviors sufﬁciently well
to detect families of attacks rather than individual instanti-
ations, thereby allowing for the detection of all the attack
variants that attempt to exploit the same weakness. With
those objectives in mind, we formulate several state-of-the-
art ADs as a multi-agent Partially Markov Decision Pro-
cess (POMDP). The proposed model, called an autonomic
detection coordinator (ADC), is expected to work in a dy-
namic manner to ﬁnd an optimal combination to adapt to the
changing system situations with satisfactory performance
in terms of predeﬁned evaluation metrics. Moreover, the
model could be easily extended to more complex situations,
such as a network with distributed ADs, sensor networks,
or wireless networks. Also, the probabilistic nature of the
model guarantees it will work in a tolerant manner. Even
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though one of the individual ADmight fail to work properly,
ADC can still collect enough intelligence from the other
ADs, and make a correct decision based on their consen-
sus. Therefore, adaptability, scalability, and dependability
enrich the functionality of ADC signiﬁcantly, compared to
a single AD.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews
some related work. In Section 3, we formulate our model
as a POMDP, and give a speciﬁc solution. In section 4, we
implement the experiments and discuss the results; further
issues are also discussed. A conclusion about our work is
given in the last section.
2 Related Work
Han et al. [9] combined multiple host-based detection
models using a decision tree to lower false alert rate with
good performance on the detection accuracy. However,
their detection models were established on the same layer
(i.e., audit events and some related parameters and at-
tributes), although the utilized information was different.
Moreover, the decision tree essentially is a static approach,
causing the model to be lack of adaptability, and the per-
formance would deteriorate dramatically with the increas-
ing number of elemental ADs. In addition, based on the
observation that the human experts always attempt to de-
sign “root-cause” signatures that “combine” different attack
characteristics in order to attain low false alarm rates and
high attack detection rates, Giacinto et al. [8] proposed an
approach to network intrusion detection by fusing multiple
classiﬁers. In this work, intrusion detection essentially was
formulated as a pattern recognition problem, and more ef-
forts were paid to the comparative studies on the fusion ap-
proaches rather than the intrusion detection problem itself,
speciﬁc analysis on the intrusion detection performance was
not the emphasis either.
In addition, many cooperative intrusion detection models
have been proposed to countermine distributed attacks by
leveraging the information collected from distributed hosts,
such as [15, 16], or to improve the accuracy of alarms by
correlating different kinds of observations of multiple het-
erogeneous sensors [10, 14]. In those models, local agents
or sensors are used to collect interesting events (from audit
data, network packets, etc.) or alarm reports, and the dis-
tributed architectures provide various communication meth-
ods to exchange the locally detection information. Com-
pared with the existing works, even though starting with
similar motivation, our work focuses more on the anomaly
detection model itself for correlating the anomaly reports
from independent anomaly surrogates, and searches an op-
timal correlation on the system state from learning instead
of relying on a predeﬁned set of rules or events. The empha-
sis is on the the analysis of the model’s anticipated behavior
from a high level viewpoint, and the effects of the comple-
mentary correlation of different observations on revealing
more anomalies.
In general, we envision a framework in which several
levels of data analysis are used as the basis to be combined
to yield a single but effective system normality characteri-
zation. We envision further an approach in which anomaly
detection models are built on a fundamental understanding
of their operating environments, and have the adaptability to
respond to the diverse demands of various system situations.
The hope is that a collection of simple surrogates based on
speciﬁc observable subjects can cooperate and evolve into
generic models with broader anomaly detection coverage
and less false alerts.
3 Model Formulation
With the motivations presented in the section 1 and based
on an observation-centric analysis on four typical ADs, we
formulate our autonomic detection coordinator (ADC) as a
POMDP model. A policy-gradient reinforcement learning
algorithm is then used to search the optimal combination
strategy based on the formulation.
3.1 Selection of Basic ADs
The selection of the individual ADs mainly takes into ac-
count following considerations:
1.) the trade-off between the computational cost and detec-
tion performance,
2.) since we use a host with UNIX OS as the experimental
scenario, all the individual ADs are host-based, and work in
different environments, or take advantage of different prop-
erties of the same observation,
3.) the population of the ADs should not be too large for the
easy of control and analysis.
Minimum Cross Entropy (MCE) based on the occur-
rence frequencies of events is selected as one AD to operate
with shell command lines; One-order Markov Chain is se-
lected to be operated with Audit Events; Sequence, time-
delay, embedding AD (STIDE) and K-Nearest-Neighbor
(KNN) are selected as two elemental ADs to work with
the system calls of privilege programs, but the properties
they utilize are different. Table 1 shows the simple compar-
ison between those four selected ADs, while the detailed
description can be found in their respective references.
3.2 A General Formulation
Assume that each AD is an autonomous entity working
in its own environment with uncertain perceptions, actions,
and feedback, and each of them takes the action indepen-
dently according to its local parameterized policy. our in-
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MCE [23] Shell Command Lines
I
R(Q Wp2)
Markov Chains [21,22] Audit Events
I I
R(Q W O)
STIDE [7] Local Ordering of System calls
I
R(Q W (O3 z + 1))
KNN [11] Frequency of System calls
I
R(Q)
’z’ is the predeﬁned window size, ’p’ is the number of unique event
tegrated detection model ADC attempts to combine those
independent entities in an optimal way, with the anticipated
behavior to suppress false alerts and achieve broader detec-
tion coverage. It is worth noting that our main concern is
the actions of independent ADs, rather than their inner de-
tection mechanisms. The independent AD decides whether
the ongoing activity is legal or malicious, and since each
of them only works in its own environment, the true sys-
tem state can only be indirectly observed through their re-
spective detection measurement, and they must maintain the
estimates of the true system state, therefore, the detection
problem is partially observable for the entire system. Fur-
thermore, the decision process is a Markov process, because
the next state of the system is dependent only upon the cur-
rent state and the previous decision. Thus, a partially ob-
servable Markov decision process is formulated here.
Formally, a POMDP contains several key parameters [1]:
• a ﬁnite state space ofq distinct states, V = {1> 2> ===> q}
of the system
• a control space of p distinct actions, X =
{1> 2> ===>p} that are available to the detection policy
• an observation space of t distinct observations, ] =
{1> 2> ===> t}
• d (possibly stochastic) reward u(l) 5 R for each state
Speciﬁcally, the interactions between an independent
AD and its operating environment includes a sequence of
decision stages:
1. At time step l (discrete), the system in a particular
state vl 5 V, and the underlying state emits an observation
}l 5 ] to the AD according to a probability distribution
(vl) over observation vectors.
2. The AD chooses an action xl 5 X using a randomized
policy, based on a probability distribution (}l) over ac-
tions, with known }l.
3. xl determines a stochastic matrix Su(xl) = [slm(xl)],
slm(xl) is the probability of making a transition from state
vl to state vm under action xl.
4. In every system state, the AD receives a reward signal
ul, while its aim is to choose a policy so as to maximize the









The above decision process shows that at each time step
the AD sees only the observations }l and the reward u(l),
while it has no knowledge of the underlying state space,
how the actions affect the evolution of states, how the re-
ward signals depend on the states, or even how the obser-
vations depend on the states. From another viewpoint, to
each randomized policy (·) and observation distribution
(·), the Markov chains for state transitions vl and vm are
generated as follows:
vl 5 V
(vl)$ }l 5 ]
(}l)$ xl 5 X
slm(xl)$ vm 5 V
In essence, all the above parameters can be organized
into a family of action-dependent matrices: p q × q tran-
sition probability matrices I , p q × q observation proba-
bility matrices K, p q × q transition reward matrices J.
(vl) is essentially a p · q · t known observation prob-
ability Su(}l|vl> xl1), while (}l) is a t · p · p action
probability Su(xl|}l> xl1). In order to parameterize these
chains, we parameterize the policies, so that (·) becomes
a function (> }l) of a set of parameters  5 Rn as well
as the observation }l. The Markov chain corresponding
to  has state transition matrix S () = slm() given by
slm() = H}l(vl)Hxl(>}l)slm(xl). Therefore, equation









As the detection process of each AD can be formulated
as partially markov decision process, the ADC naturally can
be modeled as a multi-agent POMDP. In the coordinator,
several independent ADs with distinct operating environ-
ments are incorporated. Each of them sees a distinct ob-
servation vector, and has a distinct parameterized random-
ized policy that depends on its own set of parameters. If
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Figure 1. Architecture of the Autonomic Detection Coordinator
the collection of ADs is considered as a single AD, the in-
dividual observation vectors can be combined into a single
observation vector, and similarly for the parameter vectors
and action vectors, while the common goal of those ADs
is to maximize the average reward. Effectively, each AD
treats the other ADs as a part of the system, and updates its
own policy while remaining oblivious to the existence of the
other ADs. The only communication between these coop-
erating ADs is via the globally distributed reward signal, as
shown in Figure 1. More formally, for the elemental ADs,
the set of actions X contains the cross product of all the ac-
tions available to each AD, that is,X = {x1×x2×···×xq}.
Because the AD parameters are independent, each AD in-
dependently chooses actions that are combined to form the
meta-action. For stochastic policies, the overall action dis-
tribution is the joint distribution of actions for each agent,
(x1> x2> ===xq|1> 2> ===q> }1> }2> ===}q)=
3.3 A Speciﬁc Solution
In the formulated model, the policy of the ADC is af-
fected by a concatenation parameter , while our aim is to
ﬁnd the parameter settings (the optimal control strategy) for
all the ADs that maximizes the expected long-term average
reward in equation (2). This is actually a kind of direct re-
inforcement learning problem, which is described in [4,5].
Brieﬂy, the algorithm learns to adjust the parameters 
of a randomized policy with observation }l, and chooses
actions according to (}l> ). It involves the computation
of a vector tw at time step w, and it updates according to:




where  5 (0> 1), xw(}w> ) is the probability of the action
xw under the current policy, andu denotes the gradient with
respect to the parameters . The vector tw is an eligibility
trace of the same dimensionality as ; it is used to update the
parameters, and guides the policy to climb the gradient of
the average reward. Here, we intend to apply a multi-agent
variant of the OLPOMDP algorithm [3], which has been
applied to solve a routing problem by Tao et al [17], and a
multi-neurons learning problem in the brain by Bartlett et
al [2]. The OLPOMDP gives a simple way to compute an
appropriate direction to update the parameters:
w = w1 +4 = w + w · uw · tw (4)
where the long-term average of the updates 4 lie in the
gradient direction u(), uw is the sum of the rewards, and
w is the suitable size of the steps taken in parameter space.
The key feature of the algorithm is that the only non-local
information each detector needs is a global reward signal;
detectors do not need to know any other information about
the system state in order to climb the gradient of the global
average reward.
Considering the speciﬁc characteristics of the host sys-
tem, two assumptions need to be addressed to support the
algorithm’s application:
Assumption 1 For every given , the system is ergodic
(aperiodic, irreducible), and converges to a unique steady
state v0 5 V.
Speciﬁcally, although the system’s underlying states are un-
known, it will return to a steady state ultimately; that is, the
right-hand-side of equation (2) is independent of the sys-
tem starting state, and converges with probability 1 over all
possible reward sequences {ul}.
Assumption 2 For the POMDP-based ADC which is con-
trolled by multiple independent ADs, the updates of equa-
tions (3) and (4) for the coordinator are equivalent to those
that would be used by each AD.
That is, if we let }lw denote the observation vector for AD
l> l = 4, xlw denote the action it takes, and l denote its
parameter vector, the update equation (4) is equivalent to
the individual update equations,
lw = 
l
w1 + w · uw · t
l
w (5)
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the vectors tlw 5 Rn are updated according to








where u denotes the gradient with respect to the AD’s pa-
rameters l.
In addition, to cast the independent AD in the POMDP
model, a formally deﬁnition is given as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 All the ADs have no knowledge about the ex-
act system states, in some sense, |V| is inﬁnite; the ob-
servation set ]={Normal, Malicious}, and the action set
X={Observe, Alert} according to the speciﬁc detection al-
gorithm.
Suppose an activity (local or remote) happens at time
step w, some or all of the four ADs will receive different
observation streams independently in their own operating
environments; assume (·) is a general form of the ADs’ de-
cision rule, which partitions the inﬁnite measurement space
into discretely different decision regions, with each region
corresponding to one of a ﬁnite number  (according to
the deﬁnition 1,  = 2) of possible output observations }w.
Given a measurement "0 5 R on a measurement stream c,
AD lmakes a decision with the decision rule parameterized
by a threshold value lc, as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 For every measurement stream c, there is a de-
cision rule c : R$ {0> 1} of the form
c("0) =
½
0> "0  lc
1> "0 A lc
where output “0” denotes the ‘Normal’ observation and
“1” the ‘Malicious’ observation. Corresponding actions
‘Observe’ and ‘Alert’ are taken according to the observa-
tion.
From the deﬁnition, for the ADs, there is a direct map-
ping from observations to actions:
{Qrupdo>Pdolflrxv}$ {Revhuyh>Dohuw}
therefore, the process from observation to action essentially
is deterministic. The parameter  of ADC is a concatenation
of parameters l(l = 1> 2> 3> 4), and it is a row vector with
form  = (1> 2> 3> 4). Furthermore, it is worth not-
ing that l is only the threshold that determines the distance
between normal activities and anomaly activities, while the
action of ADs are also affected by other inner parameters.
For instance, for STIDE, the window size of system call se-
quences z, the locality frame count (LFC) O can also be
adjusted to impact the observation. For MCE, the length of
command blocks O is also an adjustable parameters (but ac-
tually according to the login session). While for the Markov
Chain detector, the length of sequences O is regarded as the
parametric variables which affects the similarity between
two sequences. However, because most of those inner pa-
rameters are related to the training phase, we do not include
them into the concatenation parameter vector  here.
The next consideration is to to derive the second term
of the right-hand side in equation (6) for every independent
AD. Since it is difﬁcult to parameterize the underlying de-
tection schemes with l, in order to make the ADs trainable
and save computational cost, we assume a general proba-
bilistic model for the behavior of AD. Speciﬁcally, if we
assume s is the a prior detection probability of AD, the







taking the distribution as the function of the expected num-































Obviously, Sy(q) is a Poisson distribution. Hence, for the
independent AD, its action xw generally obeys the following
rule (based on the fact that the number of anomalies is much
smaller than that of normal activities, we describe the model
of Su(xw = 0) rather than Su(xw = 1)).
Su(Observe without Alarms) = Su(xw = 0) = *(%w)
(8)






where lw is the threshold of lth AD at time instant w, while
glw(c) denotes the measurement distance between ongoing
observations c and the normal patterns. Assumption 2
shows how to update the threshold lw in the direction that
maximally increases the long-term average of the reward.
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To complete the picture we need to deﬁne a performance
measure for the detection result, which can be taken as a
reward signal to guide the improvement of the general de-
tection performance. As we know, in the anomaly detection
domain, some or all of following cases might happen:
• Nq, legal behavior is detected as normal
• Nd, legal behavior is detected as anomaly
• Aq, illegal behavior is detected as normal
• Ad, illegal behavior is detected as anomaly
Based on those four cases, a natural performance metric
can be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 3 Assume that during a particular time period
w, p activities occurred, among those activities, l 5 Nq,
m 5 Nd, n 5 Aq, and o 5 Ad, if we assign z1, z2, z3, and
z4 to denote their respective weights, and  = z1 · l@p,
 = z2 · m@p,  = z3 · n@p,  = z4 · o@p, a reward
signal can be deﬁned as uw =  ·    · , while z1, z2,
z3 and z4 is deﬁned according to various system situation
and security demands.
Due to the nature of anomaly detection, and the fact that
the number of normal activities is much larger than that of
anomalies, we usually set z1 ? z3 ? z4 ? z2.
In essence, the anticipated behavior of our autonomic de-
tection coordinator is based on the consensus of meta-AD,
and thus we have another assumption,
Assumption 3 Given an ongoing activity happens in the
host at time step w, logically, the POMDP-based ADC gets










where Ulg is the report of AD l about the detected anoma-
lies, while Uli is the report about the false alerts.
Based on our speciﬁc assumptions and deﬁnitions, a
modiﬁed version of algorithm OLPOMDP [4] can be used
to describe the independent AD l as follows:
AlgorithmModel of ADC meta-action
1: Given:
Coefﬁcient  M [0> 1),
Step size 0,
Initial system state v0,
Initial thresholds of independent ADs l0, i.e., lw in
concatenation vector .
2: begin
3: for discrete time instant w = 1> 2> · · · do
4: Get ongoing observations and their corresponding
measurement stream c.
5: Generate action xlw according to the speciﬁc detection
scheme and deﬁnition 2.
6: The coordinator broadcasts the reward signal uw.
7: Update tlw+1 according to equation (6) and (10):
Figure 2. Experiment Procedure
8: if the previous actions is “Observe” (i.e., xw = 0)
9: tlw+1 =  · tlw 3 1glw(c)
.
10: else





13: Update lw+1 according to equation (5):
14: lw+1 = lw + w · uw · tlw+1.
15: end for
16: end
Note that uw in equation (6) is the sum of rewards that
have been received, and tlw is a trace of the same dimen-
sionality as lw, with tl0 = 0;  5 [0> 1) is a free parameter
to control both the bias and the variance of the estimates
produced by the algorithm. It has been shown that [2] pro-
vided the bias is sufﬁciently small, it will converge to a re-
gion of near-zero gradient, which thus can be extended to
the multi-detector environment, and the algorithm does not
need access to the underlying state and does not make use
of recurrent states.
4 Performance Veriﬁcation
This section describes the evaluation of our proposed
ADC prototype, and the general evaluation procedure is
shown in ﬁgure 2. Speciﬁcally, the procedure mainly in-
cludes following steps:
Step 1. To train the individual ADs with training data set 1,
which only contains normal data, to get their initial param-
eters and create normal proﬁles in their respective operating
environments.
Step 2.To train the ADC with training data set 2 (only pure
normal data, or mixed with some known anomalies). This
step can be combined with step 1 if some satisﬁed data with
controllable property are available.
Step 3. After the ADC achieved a stable state through step
2, testing set (collected data with some artiﬁcial anomalies)
is used to evaluate its performance it terms of detection ac-
curacy and false alarms.
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Table 2. Statistics of the Data Source
Data Category\Source No. of Command Lines No. of Audit Events No. of Processes
Training Set (Normal) 5,600 62,100 640
Normal Data 5,640 70,780 690
Testing Set Masquerader 2127 850 272
Other Attacks no trail uncounted 35
4.1 Experiment Scenario and Data Collection
An intrusion instance is exempliﬁed in the following
to show the operating scenario of our ADC. A keyboard
masquerader or remote interloper takes control of a termi-
nal/host, and then takes advantage of the legitimate user’s
privileges and access to system programs and data. The in-
truder may attempt to read or write access to private data,
acquire unauthorized system privileges (or even abuse of
legitimate privileges), and install some softwares such as
Trojan for further malicious behavior. For the sophisticated
intruder with knowledge of AD installed in target terminal,
he might take some seeming legal tricks to surpass the de-
tection coverage. In such activity, the intruder leaves trace
data, in various forms, to victim terminal, such as shell
command lines (especially for keyboard masquerader) with
corresponding audit events, privilege processes with system
calls, etc. The ADC is thus expected to detect those anoma-
lies during the malicious attacks based on the trace data.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no true trace data
in the open literature that meets our experimental demands.
Therefore, we have to collect, combine and formulate our
own experimental data with some particular considerations.
For the sake of simplicity, all the basic ADs we employe are
initialized with the parameters in their original literature; in
other words, the ﬁrst step is omitted in our experiment. To
formulate training data set 2 and the testing data, we have
collected normal activities ourselves for four weeks using
the Solaris 8.0 operating system (SunOS release 5.0), mixed
with several known typical host-based attacks.
We usually use text editor (vi, ed, etc.), compiler(gcc,
cc, etc.), and some system programs(ps, lpr, sendmail etc.)
on our machine SunBlade 1500. Excluding wrong com-
mands and some noisy data, while keeping repeated ones,
we obtained a total of 132,886 records of BSM audit data
and 11,240 shell command lines (using the shell .history ﬁle
to log all truncated commands without additional informa-
tion), and these data were roughly averaged as part of pure
training set and as testing set. Note that during the collec-
tion of shell command lines, we also recorded the corre-
sponding audit events and executed processes in terms of
system calls, as BSM provides the monitor of the execution
of system calls by all processes launched by the user. How-
ever, considering the processes in user mode usually cannot
Table 3. Attacks List in the Experiments
Attack Category Attack Description # of Cases
Masquerader access to programs and data as an 850
imposter by controlling the keyboard commands
xlock heap buffer overﬂow vulnerability 2
Buffer Overﬂow eject buffer overﬂow vulnerability 3
lpset buffer overﬂow vulnerability 3
Exhausting Disk Space (with dd) 2
DoS Exhausting the Memory 1
Consumption of process table 2
harm the system security, we only recorded those processes
in kernel model that require services from system kernel. In
addition, it is well known that buffer overﬂow, S/W secu-
rity error, conﬁguration error and DoS attacks are several
prevalent host-based attacks, so we injected several cases
of them (audit data that contain labelled attacks), including
8 cases of local buffer overﬂow and 5 cases of DoS, into
the testing data. Meanwhile, a small batch of another user’s
commands history (2127 audit events, 850 command lines,
and 272 processes) were also added into the testing set as
a masquerader trace data. Table 2 and table 3 shows the
experimental data we used in detail.
4.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
All the basic ADs’ initial parameters we used were di-
rectly derived from their original version (as shown in Table
4) without training. Thus, the parameter vector  is a ma-
trix with sizeQ ×P , whereP is the number of elemental
ADs, Q is the number of controllable parameters, and the
Table 4 can be denoted as following in terms of 0, which is
the initial state of the coordinator. But in actual experiment,
we only adjust the ﬁrst row of , i.e.,Q = 1>P = 4.
0 =
µ
0=45 0=80 0=60 0=72
30 10 6 0
¶
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Table 4. Parameters of Basic ADs
* ’L’ denotes Sequence Length, ’’ is the threshold
MCE Markov Chain STIDE KNN
O 30 10 6(LFC=20) variable
 0.45 0.80 0.6 0.72























Figure 3. Reward Signal During Training
4.2.1 Training Procedure
The goal of the training procedure is to achieve an optimal
control strategy of the ADC. As shown in table 2, all 5,600
command tokens were used to create a distribution-based
behavioral model for MCE. Corresponding audit events
and processes were also used to create normal proﬁles for
Markov Chains, STIDE, and KNN respectively. Since the
amount of the available data are limited, we used joint sets
to train ADC, in detail, half of training data were inter-
leaved with half of testing data (altogether 5,620 command
tokens, 66,400 audit events, and 660 processes) to train the
ADC. As every login session (i.e., from login to logout)
contains about 30 command tokens, for simplicity, we used
a constant window to partition command tokens, with cor-
responding audit events and system calls. Hence, a total
b562030 c = 187 commands blocks were available. Corre-
sponding audit events and system calls that executed by pro-
cesses were also extracted as input into respective ADs. The
baseline of the ADC detection measurement is command
blocks, which has no so exact mapping with their underly-
ing audit events and processes. Therefore, Markov Chain,
STIDE and KNN would generate a report sequence rather
than a single report at every decision step, based on their
respective detection measurement and parameters.
In this experiment, ADC makes decision at every com-
mand trace, and according to deﬁnition 3, sinceAq andAd
would never appear in the normal training set, for a pursued



























Figure 4. False Positive Rate on Testing Data
probabilistic policy, the long-term expected average reward
would be calculated based on the probabilities of two out-
come occurring: Nq and Nd. Hence uw is simpliﬁed as
  , in addition, as the ADC gets reward signal at ev-
ery decision step, uw can be further simpliﬁed as z1  z2.
Speciﬁcally, at each time step, for the observation trace, if
ADC takes action “Observe”, reward signal is assigned 0, if
the action is “Alarm”, reward signal is assigned 1. A total
reward signal is then calculated after one pass through the
sequence data concatenated by observation traces (the ideal
value should be 0). To simplify the consensus strategy, any
false alarm reported by any elemental AD would led to the
“Alarm” action of ADC, with penalty to all ADs.
Figure 3 depicts the ADC’s behavior during the train-
ing phase (with 500 training epochs, parameters =0.90 and
1 = 2 · · · = 103). The upper part of the ﬁgure shows
the changing of the number of false alarms in the training
phase, and the lower part of the ﬁgure shows the average
reward signal (to manifest the trend, ADC only considered
the past 10 passes, i.e., W=10 in equation (2)). The ﬁg-
ure shows clearly that the ADC had incrementally improved
performance during the training phase, as the reward signal
improves, on average, over time to an optimum. We found
that after the 462th pass, there was no false alarm triggered.
After being trained, the parameter vector of ADC  is:
 =
µ
0=42 0=84 0=69 0=79
30 10 6 0
¶
4.2.2 Testing of False Alarms
To evaluate the capability of the ADC to suppress false
alarms, we tested the trained ADC using the normal test-
ing set in table 2. The testing data was also divided into 188
commands traces (each trace contains 30 command tokens),
together with their underlying audit events and processes.
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Table 5. Comparison of masquerade detec-
tion results between MCE and ADC
Methods MCE ADC
# of normal command traces 188 188
# of anomalous Command traces 28 28




Total Detected 21 23
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the average false
alarm rate (the number of false alerts over the number of
command traces) and the number of command traces used
for testing data. Since the ADC gives the report with the
pace of each command trace, we compared its performance
with that of MCE (with initial parameter), which also re-
ports once on every command trace.
The ﬁgure shows that the ADC triggered less false alerts
compared with MCE. ADC generated its ﬁrst false alarm
at the 101th command trace (i.e., F.P.=0.99%, ﬁrst 94 com-
mand traces has been used to train ADC, thereby no false
alarms were triggered until the 101th command trace). At
the 183th command trace, MCE has generated 11 alerts,
i.e., F.P.=6.01%, while the ADC only generated 4 alerts,
F.P.=2.19%. We found that at the 128th and 171th com-
mand traces, MCE did not report false alarm, while ADC
reported, which means that one of the other 3 ADs has made
wrong actions. Although the analysis of other three ADs are
helpful to insight into the story, we did not carry it out here,
because of the intractable data partition and the lack of a
compelling need to do. In addition, the parameter used by
the MCE was directly derived from the ADC rather than by
individual training, therefore, we can not rule out the pos-
sibility that the MCE might achieve better performance af-
ter being trained and parameterized carefully with another
training dataset.
4.2.3 Detection of Common Exploits
First, we evaluated the ADC’s masquerade detection perfor-
mance. 850 command tokens (with underlying 2127 audit
events and 272 processes) of another user were truncated
into 28 command traces (each login session also contains
30 command tokens or so), and injected at randomly se-
lected positions, without replacement, into the stream of
original 188 command traces (a more complicated case
is to inject the command traces into the command tokens
Table 6. Detection Performance Comparison
(‘B’ denotes Buffer overﬂow instance, ‘D’ denotes DoS instance)
Hits(%) F.P.(%) Detected Attacks Threshold
Markov Chain 84.62 4.35 8B+3D 0.88
STIDE 92.30 3.48 8B+4D 0.75
KNN 76.92 5.36 8B+2D 0.95
ADC 100.00 1.01 8B+5D 3
instead of command traces; in such a case, the bound-
aries between the traces might generate uncontrollable false
alarms). Meanwhile, the underlying audit events and pro-
cesses that have been executed by the ‘masquerader’ were
also injected into the respective normal observation traces.
The result is shown in Table 5, among total 216 command
traces (188 normal + 28 anomalous), MCE detected 20 out
of 28 anomalous command traces with a F.P. 11.17% by
regulating the threshold to 0.38. After this detection spot,
the F.P. raised sharply to 100% with a total 21 anomalous
command traces being detected. While the trained ADC
detected 23 anomalous command traces with a F.P. 9.57%.
Second, the trained ADC was used to detect the injected
attacks that shown in Table 3, and its performance was com-
pared with that of the individual ADs. In our work, detec-
tion accuracy is deﬁned as the ratio of the detected attacks
to all the injected attacks (hidden in 35 intrusive processes).
false alert rate is the ratio of the misreports to all the nor-
mal processes (total 690). To simplify the experiment while
keeping the validity, we assumed that the false alerts would
not be generated by those normal traces that have been used
in the last experiment for testing false alerts, and the consen-
sus strategy hence was adjusted as: any ‘Alarm’ report from
any individual ADs would cause the ADC to take ‘Alarm’
action. The initial parameters used by the individual ADs
were directly derived from the ADC, while to investigate
the relationship between detection accuracy and F.P., we
had to adjust them individually. Table 6 shows the detec-
tion result of the ADC, and the best trad-off between the
detection accuracy and F.P. of the elemental ADs by adjust-
ing respective thresholds (a higher detection performance
would cause a dramatic increase of false alerts). Speciﬁ-
cally, we have following observations:
• since the intrusive processes were injected into the normal
processes without corresponding command traces, MCE al-
ways took action ‘Observe’;
• the ADC detected all the injected attacks by combing the
reports from elemental ADs, while its false alert rate was
very low (i.e., 7 among 690 processes were misreported);
• all the ADs detected all the buffer overﬂow attacks, while
some DoS attacks were not discovered.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
Based on the assumption that optimal combination of
several observation-speciﬁc ADs may broaden detection
coverage, suppress the false positive rate, and probably cap-
ture “root-cause” attacks, a POMDP model was formulated
and a policy-gradient reinforcement learning algorithm was
applied to tackle the delayed reward, partially observable,
multi-agent learning problem. In next stage, we intend to
collect more real trace data (and some artiﬁcial anomalies)
to enrich the experiments. Some additional problems, such
as computational cost, real-time response ability, and con-
sensus efﬁciency, also need careful consideration. Further-
more, we will extend our work to the computer networks,
to verify whether our ADC can detect distributed attacks
with ADs locating in several dominated hosts. Anomalies
in wireless networks or sensor networks are also expected
to be detected through the optimal cooperation of location-
centric ADs.
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